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1. Introduction 
In semantic theory it is generally assumed that with simple sentences like the 
following ones we attribute properties or relations to some individual objects: 
( 1 )  The Rhine is polluted. 
(2) W.A. Mozart visited Paris. 
(3) Woody Allen is funny. 
Herein the verbs specify the attributed properties or relations and the proper names 
the individual objects of which those properties or relations are claimed to hold. But 
consider now the following sentences which arise from ( 1 )  - (3) simply by adding 
some modifiers, here adjectives, to the proper names: 
(4) The upper Rhine is polluted. 
(5) The young W.A. Mozart visited Paris.  
(6) The joking Woody Allen is funny. 
It is obvious that (4) - (6) have different semantic contents from the corresponding 
ones in ( 1 )  - (3). For the sentences in the first group can all be true while the 
corresponding sentences in the second one are false. For instance with regard to (2) 
and (5) this could be the case if W.A. Mozart had visited Paris only in his later 
years. This allows us also to say the following without any contradiction: 
(7) The young W.A. Mozart did not visit Paris but the old W.A. Mozart did. 
Yet this sentence would be contradictory if we substituted W.A. Mozart for the two 
modified NPs or modified proper names, as we will call them. Thus the semantic 
contribution of such modified proper names must be different from the ones of the 
corresponding bare proper names . But what do those modified proper names 
contribute to the semantic contents of the sentences? And what are the contents of 
those sentences? Do we still attribute properties or relations to certain individuals? 
In this paper it will be argued (i) that with sentences like (4) - (7) in which 
modified proper names occur we are not attributing anything to individual objects 
but to some of their parts and (ii) that the modified proper names denote those 
parts. Initial evidence for such a part-analysis comes from examples like (4) or (8) :  
(8) Eastern Scotland gets a lot of sun.· 
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which can be rephrased explicitly by using the noun part as in (9) and ( 10) : 
(9) The upper part of the Rhine is polluted. 
( 10) The eastern part of Scotland gets a lot of sun. 
But on semantic grounds it will be argued that a part-analysis also works best for 
examples like (5) - (7) or the following one where a qualifying phrase is used with 
a proper name: 
( 1 1 ) The Paris of the 20ies was exciting. 
In such cases we are not attributing a property to a spatial part of an individual as in 
(4) or (8) - ( 10) but to a certain temporal part. 
In the first sections of the paper two alternative analyses of the above 
examples will be discussed: first, the adverbial analysis arising from the 
philosophical literature, for instance from Lowe (88), and second, Landman's (89) 
account which stems from his treatment of appositive as-phrases. Yet it will be 
argued that those analyses fall short on semantic grounds, i.e., they are neither 
compositional or uniform, nor are they able to explain the logical behaviour 
envinced by the above examples. As an alternative, in the following section the 
part-analysis will be worked out in detail. Under this analysis proper names denote 
sets of spatio-temporal parts of individuals as suggested by Quine (60). This will 
give us a semantically satisfying analysis of the above modified proper names 
under which they pick out certain parts of those sets. In the final section some 
prima facie objections against the part-analysis will be dealt with. In particular it 
will be shown that this analysis can be embedded into recent algebraic approaches 
suggested by Link (83) or Ojeda (9 1 )  that provide a unified semantics of common 
nouns. 
2. The Adverbial Analysis 
The surface structure of sentences (4) - (8) or ( 1 1 )  suggests that modifiers like 
young or qualifiers like in the 20ies are constituents of the resulting NPs, thus they 
should somehow affect their semantic values. Yet with regard to similar examples 
it has been argued that they have an adverbial status in the sense of specifying 
when and where some relation or property holds of some individual objects; see for 
instance Lowe (88) and also Haslanger (88) for such views. The modifiers are 
assumed to play the same semantic role as the prepositional phrases in the 
following examples: 
( 1 2) The Rhine is polluted in France. 
( 1 3) W.A. Mozart visited Paris in 1 762. 
Note that under this kind of approach we would with (4) - (6) attribute the same 
predicates or relations to the same individuals as we do in ( 1 )  - (3). By adding 
modifiers like young or upper we are simply specifying more in detail when 
Mozart visited Paris or where the Rhine is polluted. Evidence for this adverbial 
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analysis seems to derive from the fact that for instance (5) can be rephrased as 
follows: 
( 14) W.A. Mozart visited Paris in his youth. 
But despite this prima facie evidence I believe that the adverbial analysis 
fails on semantic grounds. First, it does not offer a compositional analysis nor a 
uniform one that fits in with other accounts of similar constructions .  For example, 
one would expect that the determiner and the modifiers in (4) - (6) play the same 
role as they do in examples like the following ones: 
( 1 5) The young man is tall. 
( 1 6) The upper flat is the most expensive one. 
But the role of the determiner simply gets ignored under the adverbial analysis and 
the noun modifiers are supposed to play the role of prepositional phrases or give 
rise to them in some mysterious way. Secondly, and even more importantly, the 
adverbial analysis seems unable to account for certain examples in which modified 
proper names occur. Consider for instance the following sentences with such NPs 
in object position: 
( 17) Mary likes the Paris of the 20ies 
( 1 8) John finds the young Bogart attractive. 
With regard to such examples it seems implausible to say that the temporal 
modifiers or qualifiers specify the time when some property or relation holds of a 
certain individual. For instance in order for ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) to be true neither must 
Mary have liked Paris in the 20ies nor must John have found Bogart attractive in 
Bogart's youth. In fact the truth of ( 17) and ( 1 8) is compatible with the truth of the 
following sentences: 
( 1 9) Mary started to like the Paris of the 20ies after visiting the 1 993 Paris 
exhibition. 
(20) John only recently started finding the young Bogart attractive . 
To summarize, the account of modified proper names given by the adverbial 
analysis neither seems to be uniform nor compositional, and even more 
importantly it yields the wrong contents for examples like ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) ,  i.e., it 
makes wrong predictions regarding the logical behaviour of certain examples. 1 
3. Restricted NPs and Intensional Individuals 
In his paper "Groups II" , Landman deals with intensional plural expressions like 
committee.  He proposes to treat them analogously to the NPs in the following 
sentences which consist of a proper name and a qualifying as-phrase: 
(2 1 )  John as a judge is trustworthy. 
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(22) John as the president of the football club is corrupt. 
Note that although John as a judge can be trustworthy he might not be so as the 
president of the football club, i.e., the truth of (2 1)  is compatible with that of (22). 
Or to put it differently: substitution of the NPs in (2 1 )  and (22) for each other is not 
truth preserving, thus their semantic contribution seems to be different and in 
particular different from the one of the bare proper name John. It is obvious that 
examples (2 1 )  and (22) strongly resemble the ones we discussed in previous 
sections. For adding as-phrases to proper names and turning them into complex 
NPs has the same semantic effect as it had in the above examples where we added 
other kinds of modifiers or qualifiers. 
Landman proposes to treat examples (2 1 )  and (22) as intensional contexts in 
which we do not attribute a property to an individual as such, but only under a 
certain aspect, i .e. , to an intensional individual as he calls it. Then sentences (2 1 )  
and (22) can both be  true because the NPs in  them denote different intensional 
individuals.  What gives rise to the intensionality of these examples are the 
appositive as-phrases which are assumed to restrict the denotation of the NPs in a 
particular way. According to Landman such restrictions can also be made implicitly 
as for instance in the following examples: 
(23) The judge is on strike. 
(24) The judge is the hangman. 
(25) The hangman is on strike. 
Sentences (23) and (25) constitute intensional contexts since it is possible that (23) 
and (24) can both be true while (25) is false. The only difference to the above 
example is that the NPs in (23) and (25) involve some hidden restrictions that give 
rise to this intensionality which for instance with regard to (23) can be made explicit 
as follows: 
(26) The judge as a judge is on strike. 
Landman formalizes intensional individuals as set of properties. For an 
extensional individual like John the usual correspondence between the individual 
itself and the set of all its properties holds, i.e., predicating something of John can 
be restated in terms of predicating something of the following set of properties: 
(27) { PI P(john) } .  
However for restricted NPs like John as a judge which are assumed to give rise to 
intensional contexts we do not have such a correspondence. They are assumed to 
denote sets of properties which are different from ones like (27). Landman defines 
some plausible closure conditions on such sets which turn restricted NPs into 
ultra filters of properties. This leads to an intensional treatment of properties in the 
model of the language since in any extensional framework the set of properties 
denoted by a restricted term like John as a judge would equal (27) and that is 
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something we clearly do not want; see Landman (89) for a proof of this feature. As 
part of his intensional model Landman assumes a function of restriction, let us call 
it fres, that takes an individual and a property and maps it onto a set of properties. 
Then, if we have a restricted NP like John as a judge, its semantic value is given as 
follows: 
(28) [ [John as a judge]] = fres(john, Judge). 
Now, it seems that depending on the way this restriction function is defmed 
we can get different denotations for the NPs in (2 1 )  and (22) . But it is not clear 
which values fres will give us . For as far as I can see we do not have a notion of an 
individual having a property as something or under a certain aspect. Rather we 
think of individuals as having properties simpliciter or relative to times as in John 
was tired this weekend. But let us assume for a moment that this notion could be 
illuminated further. Then the central question becomes whether a Landman-style 
analysis also seems suitable for examples (4) - (8) or ( 1 1) .  According to such an 
analysis, we would be dealing here with intensional contexts where the modified 
proper names like The upper Rhine or The young Mozart function as restricted 
NPs in the sense of denoting certain sets of properties. Clearly, given such kinds of 
denotations we would get enough "finegrainedness" to account for the logical 
behaviour of the constructions in which they occur. But the problem is that those 
examples do not seem to constitute intensional contexts. For instance it seems 
impossible that (4) and (29) are true while (30) is true is well: 
(4) The upper Rhine is polluted. 
(29) The French Rhine IS not polluted. 
(30) The upper Rhine is (identical with) the French Rhine. 
Whenever (4) and (29) are true (30) must be false. The same case can be made 
with regard to temporally modified proper names. For instance (7) and (3 1 )  cannot 
both be true: 
(7) The young W.A. Mozart did not visit Paris yet the old W.A. Mozart did. 
(3 1 )  The young W.A. Mozart is (identical with) the old W.A. Mozart. 
Thus, in summary, a Landman-style analysis of the modified proper names in (4) -
(8) or ( 1 1 )  seems implausible on semantic grounds. Not only is it unclear which 
intensions such NPs would denote, but more importantly, those sentences do not 
seem to constitute intensional contexts; they fail standard intensionality tests. In the 
following I will show how the part-analysis can give an extensional analysis of 
these NPs that treats them on a par with structurally identical constructions. 
4. The Part-Analysis 
The part-analysis claims that sentences like (4) - (8) in which modified proper 
names occur can be best accounted for by assuming (i) that we are not making any 
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statements about individual objects but about some of their parts and (ii) that the 
modified proper names denote those parts. This would gives us contents of the 
following kind for (4) - (6) : 
(32) Polluted(upper_paruhine); 
(33) Visited-Paris(young_part_ w .a.mozart) ; 
(34) FunnyGoking_part_ woody.allen). 
where for instance upper -partJhine stands for the upper part of the Rhine. It is 
clear that under such an analysis the logical behavior of constructions like (4) - (6) 
can be explained easily. For instance (5) and (35a) can both be true and not lead to 
any contradiction since we would make statements about different parts of Mozart 
as envinced by (35b): 
(35) a. The old W.A. Mozart did not visit Paris. 
b. -, Visited-Paris(old_part_w.a.mozart) . 
Further support for the analysis stems from the fact that parts of individuals can be 
denoted directly by NPs like The upper part of the Rhine, as noted already above. 
Yet, as it stands, the case for the part-analysis does not seem that strong. 
First, with regard to temporally modified NPs like The young W.A. Mozart, 
paraphrases involving the notion part explicitly are hard to come by. Secondly, as 
we have seen in the previous section, the logical behavior of (5) and (35a) can also 
be explained under a Landman-style analysis. Thus further arguments are needed 
for the part-analysis. One has to account for the notion of a part of an individual in 
order to illuminate the claim that The young WA. Mozart can denote such an entity. 
It would also be desirable if a compositional and uniform account for such 
modified proper names could be given that treats them semantically in the same 
way as structurally similar NPs like The young man or The upper flat in ( 1 5) and 
( 16) .  
Starting with the latter question the first thing to note is  that the NPs in (4) -
(6) and in ( 1 5) and ( 16) all have the following structure: 
(36) a. [the [Mod Noun]N' ]NP 
b. [the [Noun Qual]N' ]NP 
where Noun is a common or a proper noun, Mod or Qual a modifier or a qualifier 
and N' and NP stand for the different types of categories. It is generally assumed 
that common nouns denote some sets of entities and modifiers or qualifiers denote 
functions that map those sets onto others set of entities of the same type, i .e. , for an 
N'-constituent we get the following denotation: 
(37) [ N']] = ( xl xe [Mod/Qual]] ([Noun]] ) }2 . 
In most cases modifiers or qualifiers will be affirmative, Le., the following holds : 
(38) [Noun]] ;;d [[Mod/Qual]] ([Noun]] ) .  
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This seems to be the case with adjectives like young or old but also with eastern or 
upper; see Kamp (75) for other examples of affirmative adjectives. Now, under 
Russell's and Sharvy's (80) influential analyses of definite descriptions, expressions 
of the form (36a, b) function as incomplete symbols that lead to the following 
claims: 
(39) a. Russell 3!x { x } = { xl Xe [N']] } ;  
b.  Sharvy 3 x  x=max:s;;{ xl xe [N']]} . 
In (39a) a definite description asserts the existence of a unique element in the set 
denoted by the N'-constituent whereas in (39b) it asserts the existence of a greatest 
or maximal element in this set that is according to Sharvy partially ordered by some 
part relation �; a e [N'll is the maximal element in [N'll if for all x e [N'll x � a. 
The main advantage of Sharvy' s  analysis is that it allows for a unified treatment of 
the different kinds of common nouns, i .e. ,  for singular and plural count nouns as 
well as for mass nouns. This is the reason why it will be adopted it in the 
following. 3  But instead of treating definite description of the form (36a, b) as 
incomplete symbols we will treat them as referring expressions with the following 
Sharvy-style semantics: 
(40) IT the N'll = max:s;; { xl xe [N']]} if it exists, otherwise undefined. 
Now, if we could specify some sets as denotations for proper names that 
are ordered under a part-relation, this Sharvy-style semantics would be applicable, 
thus we would get a compositional and uniform treatment for modified proper 
names like The upper Rhine. But the problem is that not just any set will do as 
denotation for a proper name like The Rhine. Consider for instance the following 
set as its denotation: 
(4 1 )  [Rhinell = {x  I x=rhine } .  
This is a singleton set containing the river Rhine, thus combined with an affirmative 
modifier like upper, the denotation of upper Rhine could according to (38) only be 
that set or the empty set. But this leads to the problem that we would not get as 
denotation for The upper Rhine any proper part of the Rhine. Thus some other kind 
of set is needed to provide denotations for proper names. What comes to mind here 
is the following: if we conceive of individuals as entities that have parts a proper 
name can denote the set of all those parts. Then the above Sharvy-style analysis will 
in principle yield the right results, i.e. certain parts of individuals as denotations for 
NPs like The young Mozart or The upper Rhine. The function of adjectives like 
young or upper would simply be to pick out the set of those parts of an individual 
that are young or upper parts and the defmite article would give us the maximal 
element in those sets, for example for The upper Rhine the maximal upper part of 
the Rhine. 
This leads us to the question whether we can motivate a conception of 
individuals under which they consist of parts and are not atomic entities as is 
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usually assumed. The notion of an individual I want to appeal to here is that of a 
spatio-temporal region or "sausage " as outlined by Goodman (5 1 )  and Quine (60) 
and used for semantic purposes by Carlson (77) and Hinrichs (85). Regarding such 
entities it makes sense to say that they have parts, namely spatio-temporal parts, 
which can be seen as different slices of such sausages, as time slices or spatial 
slices . For instance W.A. Mozart' s arm will be a particular spatial slice of the 
sausage W.A. Mozart whereas the young Mozart will be a certain temporal slice. 
Such parts can have other spatio-temporal parts as parts. For instance Southern 
Germany which is part of Germany has MUnchen and Stuttgart as parts, or the 
young W.A. Mozart which is part of W.A. Mozart may have the child Mozart and 
the teenager Mozart as parts. Also parts of an individual can be merged or fused 
together such that the resulting entity will again be a part of that individual. For 
instance different time slices of Paris, let us say its night slices, can be merged and 
the resulting part will again be a part of Paris .  Finally ordinary properties and 
relations like Polluted or Funny as envinced by (32) and (34) can hold of such 
spatio-temporal parts, for instance Polluted of the upper Rhine or Funny of the 
joking Woody Allen. In fact the usual notion of a property P holding of an 
individual i at a time t, i.e. P(i, t) , can be reduced to the following: there is a part p 
of i such that p's temporal extension is t and P holds of p, i.e. P(p). This conception 
of individuals as complex objects can be made more precise as follows:4 
(42) a. D is a non-empty set, namely our semantic domain, and ID a non-empty 
subset of D, namely the set of all individuals i, i', i", . . .  in D; 
b. D is partially ordered by a spatio-temporal part relation :S;st. such that 
:S;st is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetrical; 
c. For each i E ID, there is a set Pi := { xl x :S;st i }  of i's parts which contains 
more elements than just i and forms a complete join semilattice under :S;st. 
i .e., it is partially ordered by :S;st and each non-empty subset P' of Pi has 
a supremum in Pi. 
On the basis of this conception of individuals it makes sense to say that a 
proper name denotes a set of parts. For as Quine (60) suggested, it simply denotes 
the set Pi of spatio-temporal parts of an individual i, where the individual itself is 
the maximal element in such a set. Thus a proper name like Mozart functions more 
like a noun or general term in the sense of denoting all those entities that make up 
Mozart or that are "Mozartizers ". Let us assume with Sharvy(80) that for each 
noun there is a part-relation :s; given on its extension which provides a partial order 
on that set. For proper names this part relation is the spatio-temporal part relation 
:S;st as described above which partially orders the union of all extensions of proper 
names; for mass nouns there might be different part relations. Further assume that 
all noun-modifiers and -qualifiers are affirmative, thus the denotations of N'­
constituents will also be partially ordered by the part relations of their head nouns. 
Then a model for our language can be defined as the structure <D, ID, IT n ,  f::;> 
where: 
(43) a. D and ID satisfy the conditions stated under (42); 
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b. [[ ] is an interpretation function that maps nouns and intransitive verb 
phrases onto subsets of D, in particular proper nouns onto some Pi for an 
individual iElD, and modifiers and qualifiers onto functions from D to D; 
c. f:::; is a function that gives for each noun N a partial order on UN] ; 
for proper nouns this partial order will be given by :S;st. 
The first thing to note is that the model provides the right denotations for 
modified proper names in examples like (4) - (8) or ( 1 1 )  assuming we add (37) 
and (40) as semantic rules for N'-constituents and NPs. For instance the NP The 
Young W.A. Mozart will denote the maximal element in the set of entities that are 
Mozartizers and young under the spatio-temporal part relation :S;st. i.e., we get the 
following: 
(44) [[The young W.A. Mozart] = max:::;sdxl Xe [[Young] ([[W.A. Mozart]] ) } .  
This denotation will be different from the one we get for The old W.A. Mozart since 
the adjectives will pick out different parts of the individual Mozart, young only 
young parts and old only old parts. For the NP The upper Rhine the analysis yields 
that part of the Rhine which is its maximal upper part and for The joking Woody 
Allen that part of Woody Allen which is his maximal joking part; the latter will be 
the fusion of all those temporal slices or stages of Woody Allen that are joking 
since the fusion is the maximum of all those joking Woody Allen parts. 
Further note that the part-analysis not only provides the right denotations for 
modified proper names but also treats them analogously to similar NPs with 
common nouns in head position. For instance for the NP The young cheese we get 
the same kind of denotation, although the part relation might be a different one here: 
(45) IT The young cheese] = max:5cheese {xl xe IT Young] ([[ Cheese]] ) } . 
In summary, the part-analysis yields the right kind of denotations for the modified 
proper names in (4) - (8) and ( 1 1 )  while not treating them in any way differently 
from other kinds of definite NPs. In particular it yields a compositional account, 
thus it succeeds on semantic grounds.5 In the following section some prima facie 
objections to the part- analysis will be discussed. 
5. Some Prima Facie Objections 
As it stands a Sharvy-style analysis of definite NPs does not apply to NPs like 
Eastern Scotland or Mozart where the definite article is missing; such NPs for 
instance occur in sentences (2) and (8). Following Burge (73) and Bach (87) I 
suggest that we should analyse them semantically by positing a null-determiner. In 
particular, assuming that the null-determiner is a definite article, the Sharvy-style 
analysis under (40) can be applied. It will yield the right kind of denotations, for 
instance for the NP W.A. Mozart the individual Mozart since the following holds 
(see also Sharvy (80) for this analysis of proper names as full NPs) : 
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(46) [ [[W.A. Mozart]] ]NP = max:S;stPw.a.mozart = w.a. mozart. 
Note that modified or unmodified mass nouns can also function as full NPs in 
themselves as the following examples show: 
(47) Cheese tastes good. 
(48) Young cheese tastes good. 
With regard to such constructions that have no definite article, one also wants to 
specify the denotations by a Sharvy-style analysis of definite NPs. Thus there is 
nothing ad hoc if we do the same regarding the structurally similar NPs in (2) and 
(8). In some contexts proper names just seem to function syntactically more like 
mass nouns, in others more like count nouns.6 
The final point I want to make relates to the recent algebraic approaches to 
providing a unified semantics of common nouns as suggested by Link (83) and 
worked out further by Ojeda (9 1) .  For one might think that the above analysis of 
proper names blurs an explanatorily important classification of the different kinds 
of common nouns as put forward by those authors. This classification is based on 
the assumptions that the semantic domain D in (43) forms a complete join 
semilattice under a part relation $; in the following we will write +D' for sup:s;D' 
and call + the join over the elements in D', with D ;2  D' . 7 Then one can define the 
notion of a minimal element and some other related notions relative to D as 
follows: 
(49) a. An element ae A, D ;2 A, is a minimal element or atom in A iff for all 
be A if b $ a then a = b; 
b. An element ae A, D ;2 A, is a molecule if it is the join of some nonempty 
set of atoms of A, i.e. a=+A' with A' is a set of atoms; 
c. An element ae A, D ;2  A, that is neither a molecule or an atom is a 
nonmolecule. 
Ojeda (89) proposes that singular and plural count nouns as well as mass nouns 
can be classified by the different kinds of entities they denote. All will denote some 
subset of our semantic universe D but the subsets will differ as follows: 
(50) a. A singular count noun (CNsing) denotes a set of atoms of D; 
b. A plural count noun (CNp\ur) denotes a set of molecules of D; 
c. A mass noun (MN) denotes a set of nonmolecules of D. 
Now the problem is that this classification rests on the assumption that individuals 
like W.A. Mozart or Woody Allen are atoms in D since they are supposed to be in 
the denotation of singular count nouns. But under the above part-analysis they are 
treated as complex entities consisting of parts. Hence the model stated in (43) 
undermines the classification of common nouns in (50) . For if individuals are not 
atoms in D, singular count nouns which are supposed to denote sets of individuals 
will at least denote sets of molecules or possibly also sets of nonmolecules, 
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depending on what kind of entities we conceive individuals to be. But fortunately 
there are ways of restoring order such as the following: 
(5 1 )  A model for our language is a structure <D, ID, [ ]] > such that <D, :5:, +> is a 
complete join semilattice, ID is subset of D and [[ ]] an interpretation function as 
defined under (43) with the following further conditions: 
(a) [[ CNsing]] is a subset of ID; 
(b) [CNplur]] is a subset of {xl x=+A, ID � A } ;  
(c) [MN]] i s  a subset of { xl x=+A, A n D \ { yl y=+B, ID � B }  "# 0 } ;  
(d) [PNll i s  a subset Pi := {xl x:S; i }  of D with ie ID. 
The set ID is the set of individual objects as outlined above relative to which a 
similar classification of nouns can be made as under (50). If we take ID as our set 
of atoms then singular count nouns denote relative to ID sets of atoms, plural count 
nouns sets of molecules that have those atoms as parts and mass nouns sets of 
entities of which some are neither atoms nor molecules relative to ID. In addition 
we have the extra condition that proper nouns denote subsets of D, namely sets of 
parts of individuals as stated under (42) and (43) .  Thus the above treatment of 
proper names does not blur the classification in (50) but rather enriches it in the 
sense that we get a general account of nouns. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have proposed a part-analysis for sentences like (4) - (8) and ( 1 1 )  in 
which modified proper names occur. According to this analysis we are attributing 
herein properties or relations to particular spatio-temporal parts of individuals that 
are denoted by the modified proper names like The young Mozart or The upper 
Rhine. Central to the part-analysis is a conception of individuals as complex objects 
consisting of spatio-temporal parts. This allows for a Quinean treatment of proper 
names under which they denote sets of parts of an individual. Then the function of 
the modifiers becomes to pick out a subset of such a set and combined with a 
Sharvy-style analysis of definite descriptions we get as denotations the maximal 
element in such a set. From a semantic perspective the proposed analysis seem 
preferable to others since it not only enables us to explain the logical behavior of 
sentences in which modified proper names occur but also does so in a 
compositional and uniform way which treats The young Mozart on a par with 
structurally similar NPs like The young man or The young cheese. What emerges is 
a unified semantic analysis of common and proper nouns according to which they 
just denote different kinds of subsets of our semantic universe D. 
Endnotes 
* I want to thank Elisabet Engdahl, Jonathan Ginzburg and Robin Cooper; the 
first for encouraging my interest in the topic of the paper and the latter two for 
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many helpful comments on different versions of it. The paper has also profited 
from the participants of SALT4 and of several workshops and discussion groups in 
Edinburgh, notably from comments by Ivan Derzhanski, Alice Drewery, Sheila 
Glasbey, Massimo Poesio, Lucia Tovena and Peter Ruhrberg. 
1 .  Note that even if semantic considerations played no role in judging the 
adequacy of the adverbial analysis it is highly questionable if it can achieve its own 
underlying aim which seems to be the avoidance of parts of individual objects in 
the semantics of sentences like (4) - (8) or ( 1 1 ) .  For instance examples involving 
spatial modifiers like (4) or (8) cannot be rephrased in the same way as (5). Their 
most suitable paraphrases seem to be the following ones which both explicitly 
mention parts of individuals : 
(a) The Rhine is polluted in its upper part. 
(b) Scotland gets a lot of sun in its eastern part. 
Thus we have at least to allow for spatial parts in our semantics. But even with 
temporal modifiers as in (5) or (6) things are not as straightforward as one might 
expect. For instance what do we denote with in his youth in ( 14)? We do not seem 
to refer to any external time instant or interval as we do in ( 1 3) with in 1 762. Thus 
here a case could be made for temporal parts of individuals. But if we have to 
assume parts anyway in our ontology one might wonder why not to allow the 
modified proper names to denote them directly as suggested under the part­
analysis. 
2. The sets of entities denoted by nouns need not necessarily be subsets of our 
semantic domain D but might be subsets of the power set of D. This seems 
plausible for instance with regard to plural count nouns like dogs or cats; see 
Landman (89) for such an account of common nouns. But in order to simplify our 
presentation I will assume in the following that the sets denoted by the different 
kinds of common nouns are always subsets of D; see Link (83) or Ojeda (9 1 )  for 
accounts that make this assumption. 
3. For mass nouns and plural count nouns Russell' s  analysis seems inadequate 
since the N'-constituents here do not have to denote singleton sets. For instance the 
N'-constituent in The Gold in ZUrich will denote a set that contains more than one 
piece of gold since there will be many of them in Zurich. The function of the 
definite article here is not to indicate uniqueness but totality, i .e. , to pick out the 
maximal element that is gold in Zurich (see Sharvy (80) and Ojeda (9 1 )  for more 
discussion of this issue). In recent years a Sharvy-style analysis of definite 
descriptions has been adopted in some algebraic approaches to the semantics of 
common nouns; see for instance Ojeda (9 1 ) .  
4. Carlson (77) makes use of  the notion of  a spatio-temporal part in  order to 
account for the two readings one gets for bare plurals, i.e. the existential and the 
universal reading. For instance a bare plural like rain drops gives rise to the 
existential reading in Rain drops fell on the city and to the universal reading in Rain 
drops are wet. In the first case we are supposed to existentially quantify over 
spatio-temporal parts of individuals, or stages as he calls them, whereas in the 
second case we predicate something of complex individual objects. What gives rise 
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to those readings are, according to Carlson, the different kinds of predicates that 
combine with a bare plural, either a stage-level predicate or an individual-level 
predicate. It should be noted that the part-readings we get for the NPs in sentences 
like (4) - (8) do not depend in any way on the involved predicates and this is one of 
the reasons why a Carlson-style explanation in tenns of stage-level predicates is not 
available to us here. 
5. The part-analysis might offer an alternative account of the Landman examples 
such as John as a judge. For instead of treating sentences in which such NPs occur 
as intensional contexts, which seems disputable anyway, one could give an 
extensional treatment under which the NPs just pick out certain parts of the sets 
denoted by the proper names. For instance John as a judge would denote the 
maximal temporal judge-acting part of John. Clearly, such a part would be different 
from his maximal football-club-president-acting part which would be denoted by 
John as the president of the football club. 
6. Burge and others noted that proper names sometimes seem to function more 
like count nouns as suggested by the following examples The Alfred who plays the 
flute joined the band today or I know few Alfreds in Edinburgh. In the light of this 
evidence Burge proposed to treat proper names as denoting sets of individuals and 
not denoting particular individuals .  One should note that on the basis of some 
minor modifications this proposal can be fitted in very easily to the above treatment 
of proper names. The most reasonable option here is to relativize the interpretation 
function [ ] to a context factor c, i.e., we get [.11 . Then relative to some c a proper 
name could denote a set of individuals but relative to another c' a set of parts of an 
individual. This would give us the right denotations for the resulting NPs in which 
those proper names occur as constituents. 
7. Note that if one takes into account how is part of gets used in natural language it 
seems more plausible that there are different part relations as suggested under (43). 
But one can make sense of a unique part relation by conceiving of it more along the 
lines of a spatio-temporal or material part relation as suggested by Goodman (5 1 )  
or  Quine(60). 
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